There are more than enough reasons for disagreements
Donald Trump's victory in the U.S. presidential election has put Turkey in a quandary. On the one hand, the winner's right-wing populism and conservative course is somewhat similar to Turkish President Recep Erdogan's ideas about the surrounding reality. On the other hand, Trump is associated with many negative phenomena in U.S.-Turkish relations. Under these circumstances, it would be useful to understand what will determine the nature of the dialog between the NATO “strategic allies”, who are characterized by a difficult temperament, today and this time.
Back in the 2016 presidential campaign, Ak-Sarai quite frankly supported Donald Trump and defiantly “approved” of him exactly as much as they hated his rival Hillary Clinton. At that time, the ruling elites of the Turkish Republic felt threatened by the Democratic Party, even subjectively, because the latter unequivocally supported not only internal discontent (remember, for example, the Gezi Park protests of 2013), but also, for example, the self-determination of the Kurds. Other strategists in Washington wanted to pretend to support this Middle Eastern nation, divided between several neighboring states, which has been very unlucky in terms of statehood. It should be noted that historically Kurds were not just an integral part of all imperial state projects in the Middle East, but often became the decisive link and state-forming voice on which the political and confessional stability of the vast region depended.
The famous historian and writer Lev Gumilev would say that the Kurds are a “passionary people.” One way or another, in 2014 it was they who found themselves on the spearhead of the confrontation with the jihadists of IS* (an organization banned in Russia). And no matter what Ankara claims, while the Turkish army silently watched from the sidelines, the Kurds taught the terrorist international a good lesson. And it was so instructive that Ankara seems to have been frightened by the Kurds' strengthening. By 2015, Recep Erdogan's “Kurdish spring” had finally given up, and the Turkish armed forces conducted several border operations, the main purpose of which, among other things, was to dismember the cantonal unity of the Syrian Kurds and change the traditional ethnic composition of these areas in favor of the Arab population.
The Kurdish issue is only one factor in the friction in U.S.-Turkish relations. Another is U.S. support for Fethullah Gulen, an enemy of the Turkish president. The renowned theologian and leader of the Hizmet organization, who acted in concert with Erdogan before the 2013 Gezi protests, has been hiding from Turkish justice in recent years until his death in his Pennsylvania mansion.
However, it would be an unacceptable oversimplification to assume that the Kurdish issue and the now deceased Gulen exhaust the entire set of Turkish-American contradictions. Of course, they are much deeper, and the two problems are only the “tip of the iceberg”. Turkey's active inclusion in regional processes and Ankara's attempt to assume the role of a supra-regional center of power have greatly worried the American ruling class. Moreover, regardless of who occupies the Oval Office, a wary attitude toward the regional ambitions of Erdogan's government has dominated on Capitol Hill (the U.S. Congress) for more than 20 years. There were also Greek, Armenian and Israeli lobbyists among the congressmen who argued, not without good reason, that not tomorrow Turkey would finally get out of control and create a kind of NATO in the region. However, to some extent they are counterbalanced by the Turkish lobby, which has become noticeably more active in recent years and with which they associate, in particular, the alleged White House chief of staff under the 47th president, a close associate of Trump, Susie Wiles.
Along with the “neo-Ottomanism” clearly transcending national borders, Ankara is actively promoting integration projects within the framework of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS), which raises questions not only in Western capitals. Although the so-called “Army of Turan” is still a long way off politically, to deny the fact that in recent years the Turks have been very active in modernizing their military-industrial complex and have made considerable progress in this regard would be an impermissible short-sightedness, and from any side. Turkish-made drones and aerospace industry (and not only) invariably attract the attention of international exhibitions. Thus, during the recent ADEX-2024 defense exhibition in Baku, the Turkish company ASELSAN signed a number of important agreements to deepen cooperation in defense and security with Azerbaijan. The Turks have visibly strengthened their position in the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Balkans and Africa, without particularly seeking the approval of anyone in Washington.
However, it was under Trump that Erdogan first decided to buy Russian air defense systems - S-400 Triumf SAMs - and for the first time under Trump that anti-Turkish sanctions were imposed, the consequences of which the parties are still dealing with. The Turks, as is known, were excluded from the program for the production of a promising multirole fighter of the fifth generation F-35, and a number of other restrictions were imposed on the Turkish Defense Industry Authority and a number of functionaries of this agency.
Trump's decision to impose so-called “aluminum sanctions” against Ankara for the “Pastor Brunson” case was widely publicized around the world. Turkey also did not forget that the “Christian Zionist ‘ has a heart for Israel, and it was under him that the U.S. moved its embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, which it recognized as the ’one and indivisible capital of Israel,” which, along with some other steps, threatened interfaith and interethnic peace in the Middle East. Of course, the billionaire, who is closely connected with the Zionist lobby, could not but know how painfully such a step is treated in Muslim states, including Turkey.
The Turkish side also remembers well the nationalistic impulses of the elected president in his first cadence. Positioning itself as the “intercessor of Muslims” and the voice of the Global South, Turkish ideologues are attentive to the issues of migration and protection of migrants' rights, especially if any political dividends can be derived from it. In this respect, for Turks and for Erdogan personally, Trump with his anti-immigrant rhetoric is negatively predictable.
The uncertainty lies only in how far Turkish-American relations will stall between 2024 and 2028. Despite the many variables in the equation, one thing can be predicted with a relatively small margin of error. Most of all, Ankara fears transatlantic or Euro-Atlantic solidarity, its united front on the part of the collective West to counter the regional or even global ambitions of the heirs of the “brilliant Porte.” The republic's economy is too closely tied to the European Union to afford a final and irrevocable break with its NATO partners. When assessing the potential lines of division between Turkey and the West, one should not forget that the EU remains the main trade partner for the Middle Eastern country (at the same time, Turkey is the 6th-7th trade and economic partner for the EU itself, depending on the foreign trade dynamics).
Thus, any friction between the EU and the US will only benefit Turkey. Repeatedly announced by Trump and his team plans to impose duties on European goods are an unconditional “holiday” for Ak-Saray. It should also be noted that it is now, after Trump's victory, that Germany has finally approved Turkey's delivery of 5th generation Eurofighter fighter jets. There is also a warming of relations between Ankara and Berlin in a number of other areas. It is possible that Turkish-French relations will also start to partially improve amid Trump's isolationist steps.
The Middle East conflict also contains explosive conflictogenic potential. The more consistently and assertively Trump supports the Netanyahu regime not in words but in deeds, the more it will complicate Turkish-American relations with all the consequences.
In Sino-American contradictions and trade wars, Turkey will also support China. Despite its own differences with Beijing, for the Middle Kingdom, Turkish territory is part of the “Middle Corridor” to Europe. Turkish politicians and business people are very interested that all major world players would perceive their country as the main transportation, logistics and energy hub in the region.
Source - Strategic Culture Foundation
Yuri KUZNETSOV