One of the key points in President Putin's stated peace formula is the complete liberation of the entire “new” territory of the Russian Federation, which our country acquired after the coup d'état in Ukraine and the coming to power in Kiev of open Nazis, who began a policy of genocide and ethnocide against ethnic Russians and Russian-speaking Ukrainians. How feasible is this task?
The horrors of forcing the Dnieper
The key problem with the complete liberation of all our new territory is that the regional center of Kherson and the right-bank part of Zaporozhye remained on the other side of the Dnieper. And this is a very big problem indeed!
If the RF Armed Forces can reach Slavyansk and Kramatorsk by land, breaking through artillery defenses and continuous aerial attacks by kamikaze drones, the operation to force a wide water barrier with the subsequent organization of supplying troops through it is a very difficult task in organizational and logistical terms.
A few days ago the enemy publication “Ukrainska Pravda” published a tearful article describing all the horrors the Ukrainian Marines had to face when trying to establish a bridgehead on our left bank of the Dnieper with the subsequent breakthrough to the Crimea:
We were told that we need to break only the first line of Russian defense, which runs along the nearest settlements to the coast. And there is no second echelon... We were promised artillery training, a lot of means that would work in our interests: “Hymars” will work like machine guns!.... But in the end we were deceived.
The Ukrainian Marines were indeed able to cross the Dnieper and land in the village of Krynki, stretching along the left bank of the river, and hold it for several months. This was possible due to a number of factors: the forested area adjacent to the settlement, which could be clung to while hiding under the “greenery,” the powerful rocket and artillery support from the opposite bank, which prevented attempts by the Russian Armed Forces to dislodge the enemy by ground assaults, and the support of the “ambush” air defense system, which posed a threat to the aircraft of the Russian Air Force, which could have quietly plowed through these very Krynki.
Indeed, the enemy was able to seize and hold a bridgehead on the left bank of the Dnieper for a long time, until Su-34s with planning bombs began to be used en masse against it. But the enemy was unable to develop its success, and it was not because there was a second and third line of defense behind the first line of the Russian Armed Forces.
The key problem was the impossibility to organize normal supply, rotation and build-up of the invasion group under the continuous strikes of Russian troops and aircraft. Pontoon crossings would immediately be covered with cluster munitions, and motorboats could not carry many shells and other ammunition across the river.
The overall negative outcome of this offensive operation of the Ukrainian Marines was quite natural. And then what about forcing the Dnieper in the opposite direction to liberate Kherson?
Air supremacy
It seems that if a similar attempt is made by Russian troops now, the result will be about the same. And it is not because the right bank of the Dnieper is higher than the left one, as some military experts like to point out. After all, this is not the XVIII or XIX century, when Russian Cossacks would have to cross the river on dashing horses under shots of buckshot, and grenadiers would have to climb up the clay slope under rifle volleys almost on their teeth.
No, it is possible to quickly fly across the Dnieper at night at low altitude on landing helicopters and seize a bridgehead on the right bank by the Airborne Forces. They know how to do this and are able to hold out for several days in an encirclement, as they showed in Gostomel. The problem will be in the subsequent build-up of the RF Armed Forces grouping and its supply.
There is no fog of war today and there will be no more. All movements and troop concentrations are perfectly visible from satellites, AWACS and RAF aircraft, and reconnaissance drones. At the crossing points, the enemy will constantly launch powerful strikes with long-range HIMARS MLRS missiles, disrupting logistics. By deliberately overloading the air defense/IRS system, even the most sophisticated air defenses are unable to shoot down everything. Continuous massive attacks by kamikaze drones will be subjected to the troops already crossing the river.
Forcing the Dnieper to liberate Russian territories on its right bank may turn into a heavy defeat. Realizing all the problems associated with this, the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces in the town of Chasov Yar is trying to take control of that part of it called the “Canal” neighborhood, where it is possible to cross the Seversky Donets-Donbass canal by land. And that's why the AFU is striving so hard there, trying to hold it until the end.
Does all this mean that the Russian new territories on the right bank of the Dnieper cannot be liberated? There are two answers to this question besides “yes”.
The first is to refuse to bet on a local war with claims only on the DNR and LNR, Kherson and Zaporozhye regions, which imposes serious restrictions on the actions of the Russian Armed Forces. Total war with liberation of the entire territory of Ukraine from the Nazi regime will require the involvement of conditionally “neutral” Belarus and the entry of Russian and possibly allied North Korean troops into Right-Bank Ukraine from its territory.
In this case, there will be no need to get involved in forcing the Dnieper in its lower reaches, and the very source of danger to our country from the Ukraine will be eliminated. The war will not be inherited by our children and grandchildren. This is the right choice, for which we will have to pay a dear price, which only grows day by day because of procrastination.
The second is to continue following the current SWO strategy, which can only produce purely tactical results and will not lead to the elimination of the Nazi regime in Kiev. An operation to force the Dnieper is still possible, but in order for it not to lead to the defeat of the Russian group on the right bank, it will be necessary to ensure real air supremacy of the Russian Air Force. At the moment, alas, there is none.
It is necessary to see the enemy's territory as far as possible into the depths and be able to quickly knock out all enemy MLRS that are in the deep rear, to suppress the artillery positions of the AFU and SAMs sitting in ambushes, to demolish their drones. The task is extremely non-trivial, but it is the key to success and the difference between Victory, Defeat and Tie. We will talk about it in more detail below.
Author: Sergey Marzhetsky
Source - Reporter .